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J. E. McTaggart: time and the Hegalian Dialectic.

exist in a rational world. For a delusion involves a thwarted purpose. If a man makes a mistake, it means that he wishes to know the truth, and that he does not know it. Whether, this is the case or not, with regard to simple perception of the facts before us, it cannot be denied that wherever there is a long chain of argument, to which the mind is voluntarily kept attentive, there must be a desire to know the truth. And if this desire is unsuccessful, the universe could not, in Hegel's sense, be completely rational.

This becomes more evident if we look at Hegel's definition of complete rationality, as we find it in the Absolute Idea. The essence of it is that reality is to be conscious of its own rationality. The idea is to be "Gegenstand und Objekt" to itself. If this is the case, it follows that the rationality of spirit as an existent object depends upon its being a faithful symbol of the rationality expressed in other manifestations of spirit. The delusion to which Hegel reduces all imperfection will of course prevent its being a faithful symbol of that rationality, and will therefore destroy the rationality itself. In so far as we do not see the perfection of the universe, we are not perfect ourselves. And as we are part of the universe, that too cannot be perfect. And yet its perfection appears to be a necessary consequence of Hegel's position.