Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/242

226 HOWAED V. KNOX: object might exist which was not definitely determined as to its quality and quantity, or definitely related to all other objects in space and time both in its persistence and in its changes, is to use words without meaning. If we could imagine such an object or, what is the same thing, if we could imagine a series of impressions or perceptions which yet it was impossible to bring under the general laws of the connexion of experience we should be conceiving of some- thing, inconsistent with the very existence of experience. If there were such objects, they could not be objects for us." 1 This, I am afraid, we shall have to amend somewhat as follows : Objects, qualities and events the world of Nature can be known to exist as such, only in virtue of the notion of externality. If objects, etc., were reducible to a series of perceptions or impressions which it was possible to bring under general laws of the connexion of experience, they would not be objective for us. (In overlooking this fact, the Hegelian idealists have fallen into the same blunder as the " psychological " idealists. This is a good illustration of the principle that " constructive metaphysics," so far as it is not mere verbiage, consists in making elementary blunders in psychology.) Objectivity and externality are thus equiva- lent expressions. But though or rather because the notion of externality is an irreducible element in all belief concerning existence, it is not itself a belief. The bare notion does not represent a rationalisation of experience, but rather the lines on which all such rationalisation must proceed. It is one side of an abstract distinction, which only receives body in an actual judgment. Briefly, we never believe in an external world simpliciter, but always in an external world of a particular kind. The only intelligible question, then, that can be asked concerning the external world in general is, How can we best improve our concep- tion of it? But this is the question which science is continually engaged in answering. " All rational attack and defence must rest on, and appeal to, certain general principles w r hich make the assailant and the defender intelligible to each other : and the Sceptic, so soon as he begins to speak, takes his stand along with his opponent upon the general basis of intelligence. To at- tempt, as the Sceptic proposes to do, to deny the very idea of knowledge which alone makes his statement intelligible to himself and to his opponent, and furnishes the only common ground upon which they can meet is like attempt- 1 Caird's Hegel, p. 116.