Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/330

314 ALEXANDER F. SHAND : And, lastly, in involuntary action there may be a genuine choice rendered abortive by the triumph of the involuntary impulse. It is, however, difficult to find any unambiguous example of such a type. There are no doubt cases of morbid ideas that possess and fascinate attention, which we resist at times and at other times question whether we should an} 7 longer continue our futile resistance ; yet supposing we resolved to continue it after such question and doubt, our resistance is choice, but it does not follow it was persisted in until the involuntary action escaped. What commonly happens is that the involuntary impulse gathers fresh strength and is suddenly realised without our thinking of resisting it until too late. It is then only involuntary in the sense of being opposed to a prior volition that we have never consciousl} 7 revoked, but forgotten at the crucial moment. Many of our actions that in strictness are non- voluntary, as containing at that moment neither the volition to do or not to do them, would in this sense fall w r ithin the category of involuntary actions. Our good resolutions are forgotten, but seldom revoked. VI. WILL AS IMPERATIVE. At the end of his long and brilliant chapter on the will, after having shown in vivid illustration that its essential character is effort of attending, Prof. James comes to recog- nise that some complex types contain an additional consti- tuent. This he frankly confesses he cannot analyse. We may name it a consent, a fiat or imperative, but we can go no farther : " the indicative and imperative moods are as much ultimate categories of thinking as they are of gram- mar ! " l It is a curious fact that while we frequently use the im- perative mood where our object is to control the conduct of another, we seldom if ever use it at the moment of volition, in the control of our own conduct. But if we listen to the inward voices at times of stress and doubt, in the conflict preceding choice, we find that they often address us in the imperative mood. The moral sentiment so frequently adopts this attitude that we name it the moral imperative; and our mutinous desires also call to us through the fight : " Do it, take it, away with your scruples ! " But the response of our will is different. It is like the action of a man that seizes a fellow-creature who is falling and cannot save him- 1 Prin. of Psy., vol. ii. p. 569.