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ALBERT LEVY, Psychologie du Caractere. 415 In the general lines of his theory of character, the author seems to follow M. Fouillee. Like him he takes as his basis the distinc- tion between the innate and acquired character. The importance of this distinction for the theory of character would be justified if we could apply it with the same success as the distinction between instinctive and acquired actions in biology. Even the biologist has to proceed with great caution in deciding whether the co-ordinate activities of some bird or mammal are instinctive or acquired. He must observe and experiment with them at the earliest possible moment after they are hatched or born. And in the case of some deferred instincts it is difficult to estimate how much is congenital, how much acquired. But in dealing with the human mind our difficulties are enormously increased. The infant does not come into the world like birds and insects with relatively perfect instincts. All is immature with it ; and both its in- stincts and innate mental constitution only come to perfection through trial and repetition. The innate and acquired characters seem inextricably blended. They are not separate or distinct from one another. On the contrary it is our innate mental constitution which, in the course of its psycho-physical development, acquires new characters. It might be thought that such an obvious point of view would not be departed from ; but M. Levy disregards it. Like M. Fouillee he speaks of character as formed of successive layers (couches) at the bottom of which is the innate self. "The acquired character," he says, " the adventitious and conventional self, is but the envelope more or less dense, more or less opaque, more or less resistant which covers the natural " (p. 85). There exist in each of us " two moral individualities very distinct, the one essential, primitive, natural, the other superficial, artificial, conventional " (p. 79). Now it may be readily admitted that most of us contain a superficial character which we expose to the world and a deeper character which, through reserve and self- respect, we conceal, or disclose only to our friends. What cannot be admitted is that the one is composed of purely innate constituents, the other of purely acquired constituents. The inherited and acquired are fused in both. The same constituents, thought, emotion, desire, will, enter into both. And whatever of these constituents is congenital and not acquired by imitation, by trial and repetition, is equally innate in both. It is a pity in a work written in so attractive and pleasant a style that the author should not have subjected his leading ideas to a closer scrutiny and self-criticism. ALEXANDER F. SHAND.