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122 NEW BOOKS. favour of an objective psychology and against the interconnexion between the mental and the material are forcible, though not always convincing. Yet it is a pity that he should be almost uniformly speculative. He de- cides against the possibility of systematic introspection ; he assumes a sharp cleavage between mental and material ; he accepts the world as it appears to him as final ; but he fails to support these crucial assump- tions, knowing apparently nothing of the contentions of James and Fouillee respecting the last two propositions. Heinrich's larger work is a survey of German physiological psychology from the standpoint described in the preceding paragraph. He examines in turn Herbart, Fechner, G. E. Miiller, Wundt, Kiilpe, Miinsterberg, Ziehen, Avenarius, and a few other writers. French psychologists are represented by Descartes and Ribot, while England and America are un- represented. His chief attack is directed against the introduction of subjective factors in experimental psychology. He endeavours to show that sensations cannot be measured, and that figures referring to " con- scious " activity, as in association experiments, are untrustworthy and barren. Against Wundt and others he argues powerfully and at some length that the physical series is at no stage determined by desire, or pleasure, or any psychic factor. He holds that the physical sequence is the primary one, whilst the mental sequence is dependent and secondary. He rules out mental activity, and hence his special discussion of the problem of attention, connected as that is by many thinkers with such activity. Lack of positive support for far-reaching statements is our author's fault in this volume as in the one already referred to. His theory of attention, in spite of profuse criticisms of other writers, con- sists but of a vague suspicion that sensory accommodation is the sole factor in sensory attention. His description of the mental as embodying "our wishes, experiences, resolutions, hopes, desires, volitions, etc., etc." always carefully omitting, as he does, references to sensations and images is most unsatisfactory as a definition. His disparagement of introspective methods, without bringing forward proof of their insuffi- ciency, makes us doubt whether he has given them a fair trial. Nor does his tacit agreement with the quantitative school satisfy us that he is on the royal road to the solution of psychological questions. How- ever, Heinrich urges with force an important point, i.e., that psycholo- gists should well consider the inexpediency of dealing with a series which contains both physical and psychic factors, and the advantage of rigidly separating the two classes. GUSTAV SPILLER. Worterbuch der Philosophuche.n Begriffe und Ausdriicke. By RUDOLPH EISLBR. Lieferungen, i-viii. Berlin ; Mittler au Sohn, 1899. Pp. 800. In this Dictionary Dr. Eisler renders good service to philosophical students. The work is now in its seventh part. It is executed on a very restricted plan, and should be estimated only for what it attempts. To criticise the plan first, we find the word Worterbuch altogether too broad for a work of this character. It is in strictness a collation of sentences more or less of the character of definitions sometimes very far from such from ancient and modern writers collected under headings and put in alphabetical order. It attempts no authoritative definition of its own, makes no effort to sum up opinions, gives no discrimination of good authors from bad and often quite omits the best. It has no deri- vations (as such), no equivalents in other languages, no discrimination