Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/177

Hl.ilKL'S TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE IDEA. 163 divisions deals with questions which are, no doubt, of psychological and logical importance, but have nothing to do with the transition from Cognition Proper to the next category. To this transition we now proceed. We have said that the nature of the individual reproduces that of the unity. But, if this is true, it must be equally true that the nature of the unity reproduces that of the individuals. For the unity depends on the individuals quite as much as the in- dividuals depend on the unity. Their only meaning is to manifest it, but its only meaning is to unify them. And we have seen that such a unity can unify such individuals only on condition that the unity is for the individuals. And therefore it is just as essential for the unity that there should be the harmony, as it is for the individuals. The result of disharmony would not be more fatal to the individuals than it would be to the unity. And thus it may as well be said that the nature of the unity reproduces that of the in- dividuals, as vice-versd. Each is dependent on the other for its nature. The same argument may be put in a different form. If a harmony is imperfect, if it is only accidentally perfect, or if the necessity of its perfection is due to some outside cause, there is some meaning in saying that B harmonises with A rather than A with B. For in all these three cases a want of perfect harmony is conceivable, and our assertion means that, in such a case, we should not condemn A for the disagreement but B. We say that the actions of a good citizen are in harmony with the law, and not that the law is in harmony with them. For we can conceive that the citizen should cease to be law-abiding ; and, if he did, we should condemn his actions, and not the law, for the dis- crepancy. But if a harmony is necessarily perfect, not from any external cause, but from the nature of the things which harmonise, it is meaningless to say that A harmonises with B more than B with A. For here disharmony is incon- ceivable, since the things only exist at all by virtue of their harmonising. And the dependence of one member of the harmony on the other is only intelligible when viewed in relation to actual or possible disharmony. It is therefore as true to say that the unity reproduces the content of the individuals, as it would be to say the reverse. By this we come to the category of