Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/208

194 EDWARD WESTERMARCK : ness, obviously derives its origin from moral indignation. This is not contradicted by the fact that men are frequently applauded for being just. Considering how difficult it is to be perfectly impartial and to give every man his due, especially when one's own interests are concerned, such a praise is only natural. But the notion of "justice" itself involves no praise, and what is " only just " is in no way meritorious. From the predicates springing from moral indignation and involving, or referring to, censure, we pass to those that spring from moral approval and involve praise. Foremost among these ranks the predicate good. Though " good," being affixed to a great variety of objects, takes different shades of meaning in different cases, there is one characteristic common to everything called " good ". This is hardly, as Mr. Spencer maintains, 1 its quality of being well adapted to a given purpose. It is true that the good knife is one which will cut, the good gun one which carries far and true. But I fail to see that " good " in a moral sense involves any idea of an adaptation to a given purpose, and, by calling conduct " good," we certainly do not mean that it " conduces to life in each and all ". " Good " simply expresses approval or praise of something on account of some quality which it possesses. A house is praised as " good " because it fulfils the end desired, a wine because it has an agreeable taste, a man on account of his moral worth. " Good," as a moral epithet, involves a praise which is the outward expression of the emotion of moral approval, and is affixed to an object of moral valuation on account of its tendency to call forth such an emotion. " Good " has commonly been identified with " right," but such an identification is incorrect. It is right that a father supports his young children, inasmuch as he, by supporting them, discharges a duty incumbent upon him, but we do not call him good for doing it. Nor do we style a man good because he does not kill or rob his neighbours, although his conduct is so far right. The antithesis between right and wrong is contradictory, the antithesis between good and bad is only contrary. Every act, falling within the sphere of moral valuation, that is not wrong is right, but every act that is not bad is not necessarily good. Just as we may say of a thing that it is "not bad," and yet refuse to call it "good," so we may refuse calling "good" the simple dis- charge of a duty, although the opposite conduct were bad. 1 Spencer, Tit* Data of Ethir.s, p. -21 sq.