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268 NEW BOOKS. analysis may be in detail is bound to misunderstand him. Thus to take only one instance the whole of Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge (of. the outline criticism of its principles, pp. 19, 20) becomes confusion for Prof. Fullerton, simply because he treats the human mind as a self- dependent individual : whilst Spinoza regards it as a mode of God's thinking, which is always to some extent dependent upon the other thoughts which form its context i.e. always, qua individual mind, to gome extent (more or less) unreal. Curiously enough, Prof. Fullerton refers to Ethics, ii., 17 Schol., as a passage, in which Spinoza " explicitly recognises " that "he uses the word 'idea' in two distinct senses," and shows by speaking " hesitatingly and indefinitely " that he " never clearly worked out the implications of his own assumptions". Yet this very passage, if read attentively in connexion with Spinoza's account of Ima- ginatio, disposes of the theory of an ambiguity in his use of the term ' idea '. We shall all agree (cf. Preface and 25) that it is wrong to read modern Philosophy into Spinoza except in so far as it is to be found there already. But then neither ought the Logic of Abstract Identity to be thrust upon Spinoza (cf. 8 and passim}, unless Prof. Fullerton can produce some evidence to show that it is Spinoza's as well as his own. Nor would students of Spinoza desire any more than Prof. Fullerton { 28) to " confuse his philosophical doctrine . . . with other beliefs " which he may have held and " which are either disconnected with or even contradictory to the doctrine in question ". But I hardly think they will readily accept Prof. Fullerton's exposition as Spinoza's " philo- sophical doctrine ". With regard to part iv., the author at first (p. 116) proposes to include under the word ' religious ' " those things that most of my readers, familiar as they are with the history of theological doctrine and philo- sophical speculation, will on reflexion be inclined to include under it ". This is bewildering : but at page 129 we learn that the author thinks that "the history of human thought justifies" him "in refusing to apply" the word ' religious' " to any philosophy, which, while retaining, perhaps, the word God. has divested the corresponding conception of every shred of anthropomorphic reference ". Surely, if that is so, there was no need to waste space in proving that the Spinozistic conception of God is not " religious ". If to be ' religious ' involves what Prof. Fullerton says, it is an unjust slur on Spinoza's honesty to accuse him of being 'religious' himself, and there was no need formally to acquit his system of the charge (p. 153). The translation in the book is on the whole accurate and good : but I have noticed two slips. " Mentis oculi . . . sunt ipsse demonstrationes " does not mean " the eyes of the mind . . . are themselves proofs " (p. 76) ; nor is " they could not help finding a few harmful things " an exact rendering of " non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda " (p. 132). HAROLD H. JOACHIM. A Primer of Psychology. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENBR. New York : The Macmillan Company ; London : Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1898. Pp. xvi., 314. To write a primer of Psychology is an arduous undertaking, and to write it in such a way as to give general satisfaction to psychologists is prob- ably impossible. The public for whom such a work is intended require an exposition which shall be throughout compact, clear-cut, and trans- parent. To introduce reservations and argumentative discussions is to