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368 B. E. c. JONES : account of both which is here put forward is accepted, it would seem that the relation traced between biotic and absolute Time and Space, opens a way of escape from some of the difficulties which have gathered round those con- ceptions. In the consideration of Familiarity or Expertness it is urged that there can be no beginning of experience from a tabula rasa or from a chaotic manifold (in this respect the theory here put forward is an improvement upon Kant), and that any uniformity on the part of the object would remain unknown and meaningless to any subject not itself char- acterised by continuity and uniformity. What we really mean when we talk about uniformity of Nature is uniformity of Experience. No experience deals either with things per se or with the totality of things a subject having some of that selective power which belongs to all living things, can secure an orderly environment of which it is itself the centre. There seems no warrant for the assumption made by dualism of a uniformity apart from experience the uniformity of Nature upon which Science depends is entirely conceptual. Apart from subjective interest and activity we could never predicate unity or plurality, never have repetition of experi- ence or the increase of uniqueness and definiteness which goes along with development of experience. And however far this increase of definiteness may proceed, we never trans- cend the duality in unity of subject and object, the objects are always objects of the subject : as little as I can ever " catch myself without some perception," just as little can I ever catch a perception which is a perception without me. There is always a duality in unity which has the character of an organic whole. By Intellective Synthesis is meant those features of in- dividual experience which first make intersubjective inter- course possible especially the Comparison which is first suggested by practical needs, and leads to the recognition of similarity in things and events that are partly different (ii., 164). And " Conation and Cognition working always together, the individual subject comes to distinguish its own body or self from other bodies as not-selves, and to attribute to them also likes and dislikes and the power to know and to do. It' is obvious that the presence of other individuals of its own species within its environment, together with its peculiar interest in these, will facilitate the recognition of both as selves, and so in turn make the recognition of other sorts of selves easier " (ii., 164, 165). The important question here is, How does the individual come to a consciousness of