Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/495

THE PRINCIPLE OF UvST ACTION, ETC. IS I A state of vital activity, then, precedes the advent of Consciousness. How Consciousness associates itself with these inherited activities I am not prepared to say. It is a metaphysical problem, though the most simple statement of the facts themselves seems to me to be that when certain vital conditions are realised these activities become con- sciously active. Consciousness would then be aggressive from the outset, a conscious striving. But the main question for us is whether mental process as Psychology has to con- sider it, is a process that seeks to further these original activities, to satisfy inner needs and cravings, or a process that needs the constant influx of fresh stimuli to keep it going at all. All the facts seem to point to the conclusion that there is a spontaneous call for the stimulus on the part of the conscious organism, not a mere grudging response to the merciless pricking of the outer world. Were the latter the case it is hard to see how natural selection should not by this time have devised insulating sheaths for the sense- organs so as to preserve intact the sanctity of such a funda- mental tendency. I can only concede this much of truth to M. Ferrero's position, namely, that apart from stimuli we should have no sensations. But this points not to inertia but to an indis- soluble co-operation between organism and environment, for it is equally true that apart from a certain appropriate activity of mind, the stimulus would be a mere blank sequelless physical change. Attentive mental process does not then mean a compulsion to feel interested in despite of natural propensity, but an interest that is at least spon- taneous, often voluntary. Mental Exuberance, if you will, but not mental inertia. The collapse of mental inertia as a principle of Psychology brings with it the confusion of the daughter-principle, that of Least Effort. Once we admit with Lloyd Morgan 'the restlessness, the exuberant activity, the varied playfulness, the prying curiosity, the inquisitiveness, the meddlesome mischievousness, the vigorous and healthy experimentalism of the young,' it is a far cry to the lotus land of Least Effort. Moreover, I consider there is a fundamental confusion in M. Ferrero's treatment of the subject. I would fully admit the inherent antipathy to constraint, even to control, as a mark of all activity that is restless and exuberant. The apologist of a principle of least discipline might bid for a good hearing. But it is just the natures which revel in superfluous efforts that are the most averse to constraint and discipline. The Vandal may have a horror for work, 81