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40 F. H. BRADLEY : I would venture to illustrate the above by a reference to a late work by Prof. Andrew Seth. In his interesting volume, Man's Place in the Cosmos, Prof. Seth takes up a position against phenomenalism in psychology, and I should like to point out that in that position he finds it impossible to maintain himself. The phenomenalism which he criticises appears to involve the view that phenomena are all objects or perceptions. Now this view Prof. Seth himself ap- pears to endorse, and he does not seem to find it, so far as it goes, in the least mistaken. In fact I understand him to insist himself that all the content and matter of experience, all the experienced in short, does thus consist of objects, and that phenomenalism, not in the least mistaken so far, is mis- taken only in ignoring other aspects of experience which are themselves not experienced. And 'feeling' I understand Prof. Seth to identify here simply with pleasure and pain, and in respect of these to endorse wholly the position we have sketched above, and in the teeth of fact to deny that plea- sure and pain can be made into objects or attended to or re- membered. And in short so far and up to this point Prof. Seth's position does not seem to me to call for any special remark. But the second part of the article becomes to me very interesting and instructive. In this Prof. Seth is con- cerned with the positive knowledge which we have of our own activity, and the conclusion at which he arrives seems to me to introduce a wholly different principle. Feeling becomes now for him no longer mere pleasure or pain, but it is the immediate awareness on the part of the self of its own being and activity. And this view of feeling, so far as I can judge, is in radical discrepancy with the first view, or at least would be so if its meaning and its bearings were developed. For this deliverance of feeling now surely can- not be denied to be matter which is experienced. You can surely no longer refuse to reply when you are asked as to the nature of its "what," and when inquiries are raised as to the variety of aspects within its content, you can hardly treat them as unmeaning. In short the identification of content with the "object" side of experience seems to have been tacitly given up, and with the abandonment of that prejudice the way has been cleared for quite another kind of doctrine. But I do not understand how Prof. Seth him- self fails to perceive that he has here two different views as to feeling, and that, if he accepts the second of these, he can no longer make use of the first. 1 And I will venture to I 1 do not know on what view of feeling Prof. Seth stands in that portion of his instructive review of my book in which he touches on the