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426 S. H. HODGSON t with that of Descartes. Kant sees plainly enough (K.d. r.V. Note to the " Widerlegung des Mendelssohn'schen Beweises der Eeharrlichkeit der Seele," pp. 308-9 of Hartenstein's edit, of 1853) both that the Ich denke, Descartes' cogito, expresses an experiential fact, is what he calls an " empirischer Satz," and also that it does not carry with it the existence of the res cogitans as an immediate inference. In fact, to warrant that inference two things must have been perceived immediately and together, first, the self- consciousness, the cogitatio, and second, the fact that self is an agent ; and this in the simplest moments of consciousness, that is to say, in consciousness simply as such, is impossible. It becomes possible to embrace these things in a single moment or glance of consciousness, uno intuitu, only when we have previ- ously formed and become familiar with the ideas of agent and agency, or action. And this in consciousness simply as such is impossible, unless we suppose that consciousness exists and works in certain forms, nameable as ideas or conceptions, with which it is furnished and prepared simply as consciousness, or without which it would not be consciousness, cogitatio, at all. On this assumption the existence of the Ego as res cogitans would follow immediately from the content of the cogitatio itself. But it does not follow immediately from the content of the cogitatio alone, without this assumption, because in the content of con- sciousness, taken simply as such, we are not conscious of any such forms, ideas or conceptions. In short, Descartes mistakes a comparatively late and derived content of consciousness for an original and necessary one. What course, then, does Kant take ? He straightway invents a faculty, the Verstand, which shall be furnished with certain a priori forms of thought, the Categories, and which, in conjunc- tion with another faculty, the Anschauung, shall have the second of the two perceptions mentioned above ; that is, shall be aware of its own action, as an action, upon the sense-matter furnished to it by the Anschauung, and thus warrant an assertion similar to Descartes' inference, ergo sum. These two faculties belong, by his hypothesis, to a higher unity, a Transcendent Subject, and thus the fact of reality in the Subject is upheld, as with Descartes, but only by means of the transcendental hypothesis, and, in the last resort, only in reference to the Transcendent Subject. (See K. d. r.V. " Transcendentale Deduction der Verstandes- begriffe," in 2nd edition, particularly 16 and Explanation appended to 24, pp. 123 and 135-6 in Hartenstein's edition of 1853.) Descartes erred, not indeed in supposing that some immediate inference was warranted by the cogito, but in changing the sense of the Ego in passing from premiss to conclusion, owing to his defective analysis of the cogito. The word " I " is simply designa- tive in the premiss, cogito, a popular way of expressing the fact of cogitatio. In the conclusion, ergo sum, the "I" becomes res