Page:Montesquieu - The spirit of laws.djvu/133

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OF LAWS.
81

Book V.
Chap. 11.
turally requires there should be several orders belonging to the constitution under the prince, the state is more fixed, the constitution more steady, and the person of him that governs more secure.

Cicero[1] is of opinion, that the establishing of the tribunes was the preservation of the republic. "In fact, says he, the violence of a headless people is more terrible. A chief or head is sensible that the affair depends upon himself, and therefore be thinks; but the people in their impetuosity are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry themselves." This reflection may be applied to a despotic government, which is a people without tribunes; and to a monarchy, where the people have some fort of tribunes.

In fact, it is observable, that in the commotions of a despotic government, the people hurried away by their passions, push things always as far as they can go. The disorders they commit are all extreme; whereas in monarchies things are seldom carried to excess. The chiefs are afraid on their own account, they are afraid of being abandoned; and the intermediate dependent powers[2] do not chuse that the people should have too much the upper hand. It rarely happens that the states of the kingdom are intirely corrupted. The prince adheres to these, and the seditious who have neither will nor hopes to subvert the government, have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.

In these circumstances men of prudence and authority interfere; moderate measures are first proposed, then complied with, and things at length

  1. Lib. 3. de Leg.
  2. See the first note of book 2. ch. 4.
Vol. I.
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are