Book IV.
Chap. 2.our virtues, a kind of frankness in our morals, and a particular politeness in our behaviour.
The virtues we are here taught, are less what we owe to other, than to ourselves; they are not so much what assimilates us to, as what distinguishes us from, our fellow citizens.
Here the actions of men are not judged as good, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but as extraordinary.
When honor here meets with any thing noble in our actions, it is either a judge that approves them, or a sophist by whom they are excused.
It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection, or with that of conquest; this is the reason why we never meet with so strict a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican governments.
It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the idea of greatness of soul or importance of affairs; as for instance, in politics with whose fineness it is far from being offended.
It does not forbid adulation, but when separate from the idea of a large fortune, and connected only with the sense of our mean condition.
With regard to morals, I have observed that the education of monarchies ought to admit of a certain frankness and open carriage. Truth therefore in conversation is here a necessary point. But is it for the fake of truth? by no means. Truth is requisite only because a person habituated to veracity has an air of boldness and freedom. In fact, a man of this stamp seems to lay a stress only on the things themselves, and not on the manner in which they are received.
