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CLARKE v. WALLACE ET AL.
407

with the execution of the note, and plaintiff parted with his money largely upon the strength of the guaranty, and the consideration therefor wasample. Baylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer & Eng. Enc. Law, 69, and cases cited. The benefit received by the firm in obtaining security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes material only so far as it bears upon the question of the authority of Allen to bind the firm. It is not usual for persons in business to make themselves answerable for the conduct of other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a promissory note bearing the endorsement of a firm, either as guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption that the firm name was not signed in the usual course of partnership business, and no recovery can be had by simply showing the endorsement. The holder is required to show special authority to make the endorsement on the part of the partner by whom the firm name was signed, or an authority to be implied from the common course of business of the firm, or previous course of dealing between parties, or that the endorsement was subsequently adopted and acted upon by the firm. Sweetser v. French. 2 Cush. 309: Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; Bank v. Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot v. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154; Bank v. McDonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan v. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329, 3 N.W. Rep. 944. In this case there was na previous course of dealings between the parties from which authority on the part of Allen to guaranty in the firm name could be implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent ratification on the part of the firm, or any member thereof. But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the purpose of preserving the firm assets or collecting a firm debt, and that the implied powers of a partner cover such acase. We think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further than any decided case warrants. The case of Andrews v. Congar, 102 U.S. (Co Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one member of a firm, without the consent of his copartners, indorsed in the firm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It appeared, however, that the firm owned a majority of the stock of the corporation, and the larger part of the benefits arising from the notes accrued at once to the firm.