BROWN v. NEWMAN, HODGSON ET AL. 3
been no redemption from said sale; that none of the defendants have any interest in the premises “except the estate or interest of said Mary S. Hodgson under or growing out of the said certificate of sale under said tax judgment.” As conclusions of law the court found that, as to all of the defendants except Mary S. Hodgson, the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple and entitled to immediate possession; that, as to Mary S. Hodgson, the plaintiff was, on March 12, 1904, which was the date of the commencement of this action, the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession, but that said Mary S. Hodgson had a valid lien under her certificate for $266.54; that she was entitled to her costs; that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, but “limited in its operation and effect, so far as it touches the right of the defendant, Mary S. Hodgson, under the sheriff’s certificate of tax judgment sale to their rights as they existed on the 12th day of March, 1904.”
The plaintiff has not brought the case to this court for a trial de novo upon the evidence. His assignments are upon the judg- ment roll proper. His counsel contend that error appears upon the face of the judgment roll, in this, that the trial court determined the rights of the parties as of the date of the commencement of the action instead of the date of the judgment. In our opinion, the contention is sound and must be sustained. In actions to deter- mine adverse claims to real estate, such as this, the adjudication should dispose of all conflicting claims arising under the pleadings as of the date of the judgment. If this is not done, the purpose of the action is not accomplished, and the conflicting rights of the parties are not in fact determined. It was the duty of the court under the pleadings in this case to determine the character and extent of the conflicting claims as of the date of the judgment. This was not done. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg- ment, it will be noted, are limited to the date of the commencement of the action. It is possible that facts may sometimes arise which would make it proper to limit the adjudication, but the judgment roll in this case discloses no such facts. The defendant has at- tempted to bring before this court in an amended abstract certain matters which he claims warranted the court in limiting its adjudi- cation. We agree with counsel for appellant, on his motion to strike out the amended abstract, that the matters therein contained could only be made a part of the judgment roll by being settled in a statement of case. This not having been done, they can- not therefore be considered. This appeal does not present the
