FIRST NATIONAL BANK vy. BUTTERY 329
agreement upon a valuable consideration for the payment of the debt on some day subsequent to that previously stipulated. The obvious purpose of the stipulation taken as a whole was merely to relieve the holder of the paper from the burdens made necessary by the rigid requirements of the mercantile law in order to secure the continued liability of the indorsers and sureties on the paper. Therefore what was meant by the stipulation as to extension of time was simply that in case the holder and maker should agree upon an extension the sureties and indorsers should not be discharged. The
. holder and maker of a note may at any time agree upon an exten- sion; therefore, the fact that they have that right does not affect the negotiability of the paper. It is usually said that, in order to make an instrument negotiable under the law merchant, the time of payment must be certain. ‘But a note payable on or before a certain date is negotiable. The maker of such a note has the right to pay before the date named, but the holder cannot demand payment before that date. So, in this case, the time at which the maker may elect to pay is uncertain, but the time at which the holder may de- mand payment is certain. It follows that if the holder has the absolute right to demand payment at a certain date, the note is negotiable. This is but an illustration of what we understand to be the general rule. There being nothing in the stipulation under consideration, which gave any one the right to demand of the holder of the note an extension of the time of payment, we think the time at which he could demand payment was fixed, and that, therefore, it was a negotiable note.”
In Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt. 410, a note which contained the pro- vision that “if there is not enough realized by good management in one year to have more time to pay” was held negotiable. See, also, Protection Insurance Company v. Bill, 31 Conn. 534; Farmer et al. v. Bank, 107 N. W. 170.
In Jacobs v. Gibson, 77 Mo. App. 244, the coyrt held that an agreement that the time of payment might be extended without notice did not destroy its negotiability, and said: “The time of pay- ment which is 182 days after date is certain, and if the holder exer- cises his option under the extension clause, and fixes another time, that time will be none the less certain. In legal effect we cannot discover that the agreement contained in the extension clause is different from that in a bill of exchange or promissory note which is payable at sight or on demand, or on or before maturity.”
