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POWER v. LARABEE.
153

cisions, it must be confessed, are in an unsatisfactory state. Falling back upon the very elements of the law, we find it is the undoubted constitutional right of the citizen to insist that at some step of the tax proceedings he shall be heard. This right to a hearing is fandamental and indestructable. Without it taxation is confiscation. The amount of the tax demanded of the citizen is an arbitrary exaction if he has had no legal right to be heard. It is true that the hearing, to constitute “due process of law,” need not be the same in tax proceedings as in ordinary proceedings in courts of justice. Such a rule would cause intolerable delays. It cannot be doubted that our law providing for a hearing before the boards of equalization, and designating the time when such a hearing may be had, if desired, by the taxpayer, is not vulnerable to the constitutional objection that the property of the citizen is taken without “due process of law.” Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Davidaon v. New Orleans, 96 U. 8. 97; Trustees v. City of Davenport, 65 Iowa 633, 22 N. W. Rep. 904; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78 ; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. Rep. 71; Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep, 57; State v. Tax Cases, 92 U. 8. 575-610. But it is equally well settled, and it stands upon adamant, that there shall be a hearing of some kind before some person or body. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 192: Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 164; San Mateo v. Railroad Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722-751; Santa Clara v. Railroad Co.,18 Fed. Rep. 385; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1,19 N. E. Rep, 474; Railroad Co. v. Seneca Co. (Ohio), 1 West. Rep. 94; Trustees v. City of Davenport, 65 Iowa 633, 22 N. W. Rep. 904; Boorman v. City of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. 313, 4 Pac. Rep. 31; Cooley, Taxation, 265-267 ; Investment Co. v. Parrish, 24 Fed. Rep. 197-204; Butler v. Supervisors, 26 Mich. 22; Hutson v. Protection Dist., Cal., 16 Pac. Rep. 549. Of course, if the tax is of such a nature that a hearing would be of no avail to the taxpayer—as taxes for licenses, etc.—no hearing need be provided for. Indeed, the grant of a hearing would be idle. The dis-