cited turn upon mere questions of practice arising under statutes differing from those in this state, but the general principle running through them all has our approval, viz: that the charge made in the trial court must have been made substantially—i. e. with fair and reasonable fullness—in the complaint upon which the prisoner was examined, unless the examination is waived. The statute in the state of Kansas is essentially the same as that of North Dakota upon the question involved in this record, and the Supreme Court of that state has, in the cases cited below, reached conclusions which are essentially in harmony with the views already stated in this opinion: State v. Tennison, (Kan.) 18 Pac. Rep. 948; State v. Reedy, (Kan.) 24 Pac. Rep. 66; State v. Bailey, (Kan.) 3 Pac. Rep. 769.
One point further, a decisive one, remains to be considered. We hold that the petitioner has mistaken his remedy. The writ of habeas corpus will not lie in behalf of a prisoner confined in execution upon a criminal judgment as a means of reviewing errors of procedure occurring upon the trial. Such crrors can be reviewed in this state only by the writ of error. This doctrine has long since passed beyond the domain of debate, and is reckoned among the fundamentals of the law of procedure. See petition of Semler, 41 Wis. 518; Elsner v. Shirgley, (lowa,) 45 N. W. Rep. 393; au re Ellis, (Mich.) 44 N. W. Rep 616; ex parte Ah Sam, (Cal.) 24 Pac. Rep. 276; ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 375; Wood v. Brush, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; ix re Thompson, (Mont.) 23 Pac. Rep. 933; ex parte Max, 44 Cal. 579.
It is quite clear that the question whether a prisoner accused of acrime by information filed in the District Court has had or waived a preliminary examination for the same crime is a question of procedure, pure and simple. The point presented for decision may involve questions of fact alone, or of law alone, or of both law and fact. From nature of the question, it can only arise upon the trial of the action, and it must be presented to a court which has full authority to decide the question in common with all questions arising at the trial. The question in this case arose at
