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last resort in this jurisdiction. On three different occasions (Machine Co. v. Moore, 8 N. W. Rep. 131, 2 Dak. 280; Manufacturing Co. v. Foster, (Dak.) 30 N. W. Rep. 166; and Lumber Co. v. Keefe, 41 N. W. Rep. 743, 6 Dak. 160) an effort was made to raise the point before the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory, but no ruling was ever made. In declaring the effect of statutes prohibitory in form, courts have but one object in view,-the real purpose of the statute; the real intention of the legislature in its enactment. It may be stated as a rule at common law that if a statute forbids an act to be- done—provides a penalty for doing it—any contract to do the forbidden act is void, whether the statute expressly so declares or not. Machine Co. v. Caldwell, 54 Ind. 276. And when the purpose of the enactment is the absolute prohibition of a certain act, then the performance thereof is invalid, whether the prohibited act be malum in se or simply malum prohibitum. Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. St. 198; Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437. But in determining the purpose of the enactment, courts consider the nature of the forbidden act, for the very obvious reason that when such act is immoral or criminal in its nature, or dangerous to life, health or property, the presumption must prevail that legislative wisdom intended to stamp it out; while if the act be innocent in itself and in its consequences, no such presumption necessarily arises. Among the former may be mentioned gaming contracts, contracts for the sale of intoxicating liquors, where: such sales are made criminal, contracts for the sale of discased food, champertous contracts, etc. A large number of the cases arose under statutes of this kind, and are not authority for the case at bar. To properly construe ‘statutes of the nature of the one here involved, it is necessary to first consider the powers and privileges of foreign corporations in the absence of all statutory regulations. While it is undoubtedly truce, as stated by Chief Justice Taney in Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 588, that ‘a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created,” and that “every power, however, of the description of which we are speaking, which a corporation