Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/203

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WESSEL v. D. S. B. JOHNSTON LAND & MORT. CO.
163

indicated. No case can be found wherein the party had so ample opportunity to litigate, and yet elected to pay, in which the payment was held to be involuntary. There is no allegation or sug- gestion of any immediate or special damage to her by reason of the cloud upon her title that would have been created by the deed. The only circumstance relied upon to constitute legal duress is the fact that, had respondent suffered the deed to issue, the whole value of the land would have been risked upon the successful termination of the litigation, instead of the small amount required to redeem. We are sure no case can be found wherein that circumstance, alone, has been held to render a payment involuntary. With the reasoning of the well considered case of Joannin v. Ogilvie, (Minn.) 52 N. W. Rep. 217, chiefly relied upon by counsel for respondent, we fully agree. It may be that the application of the reasoning to the facts in that case carried the court as far as any decided case has gone, but a mere statement of the facts will show their radical difference from the facts in the case at bar. There a party had placed an unfolded mechanic's lien upon certain realty. There was a prior mortgage upon the property, which was due, and foreclosure proceedings were threatened. The only resource of the owner for raising money to meet such mortgage was by placing another mortgage upon the land. This he could not do while the mechanic's lien remained of record. He paid the unfounded claim under protest, and was allowed to recover the money. There was an immediate, special, and irreparable injury, by reason of the cloud, that could not tolerate the delay incident to its removal by an action in equity. The case of Panton v. Water Co., Id. 527, was decided upon the same principle. In Shane v. City of St. Paul, 26 Minn. 543, 6 N. W. Rep. 349, the defendant was about to issue a tax deed to certain land belonging to plaintiff, upon a tax sale certificate. The sale had been made in pursuance of a judgment void upon its face. The deed, when issued, would be prima facie evidence of title, and would constitute a cloud upon plaintiff's title. He redeemed from the tax sale, under protest, and sought to