recognizing a de facto corporation; one acting as such under color of organization. If the law is disregarded in the attempt to organize the municipality, the violation of law always can be nipped in the bud by appropriate judicial proceedings. We find that our views are by no means novel. The rule that the existence of ade facto municipal corporation cannot be collaterally assailed has frequently been recognized and applied by the courts. [[Stuart v. School Dist,, 30 Mich. 69]]; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470; Kruts v. Town Co., 20 Kan. 397; Tisdale v. Town of Minonk, 46 Ill. 9; Geneva v. Cole, 61 Ill. 397; People v. Farnham, 35 Ill. 562; Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257; Skerry v. Gilmore, (Wis.) 17 N. W. Rep. 252; State v. Railroad Co., (Nev.) 25 Pac. Rep. 296; School Dist. No. 2 v. School Dist. No. 1, (Kan.) 26 Pac. Rep. 43; Railroad Co. v. Wilson, (Kan.) 6 Pac. Rep. 281; Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. 19; Stockle v. Silsbee, 41 Mich. 615, 2 N. W. Rep. 900; Burt v. Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W. Rep. 285, 289; Mendenhall v. Burton, (Kan.) 22 Pac. Rep. 558; School Directors of Union School Dist. No. 4 v. School Directors of New Union School Dist. No. 2, (Ill. Sup.) 28 N. E. Rep. 49; 15 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, 965; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 43; President, etc., v. Thompson, 20 Ill. 197; Town of Enterprise v. State, (Fla.) 10 South. Rep. 740. See 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 894; State v. Weatherby, 45 Mo. 17; Board v. Lewis, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286; Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. Rep. 500. In some of the cases time seems to have been considered an element of some importance, but the public may as. effectually be deceived by a de facto organization the day after it is complete as a decade thereafter. The time a de facto officer has been in possession of an office is never regarded as controlling. * He is as much an officer, as to the public, the day after he intrudes into the office as a year later. “The same rule which recognizes the rights of officers de facto, recognizes corporations de facto, and this is necessary for public and private security.” Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. 19, 23.
We have treated this power as if the action were upon the bonds themselves, because the holders of interest coupons may
N. D. R.—17.
