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intervener being, to the extent of his lien, the equitable assignee of the plaintiff's claim for money due him from Mead, he was also, to the same extent, the equitable assignee of the undertaking given by Sullivan on the appeal. It is a familiar principle that the assignment of the principal thing carries with it all incidents. Our Code so declares, in express terms. Section 3243, Comp. Laws. In Hobson v. Watson, 34 Me. 20, the attorney had recovered a judgment for his client. Upon this judgment he had alien for his services. The debtor in the judgment gave a poor debtor's bond, under the statute, to secure his release from execution issued upon the judgment. The client claimed the right to discharge the bond without the consent of the attorney. This the attorney contested, and it thus became necessary to determine whether the attorney had the same lien upon the bond which he had upon the judgment. The court decided that he did have such lien upon the bond, saying: “Does the lien extend to the bond in suit, and embrace it? The attorney has an interest in the judgment, to the amount of more than half of it. What is the nature of that interest? It is the property in it, to the extent of such interest, as much as if the creditor had assigned it to him as collateral security for his fees and disbursements; and, it being the property of the attorney, he has all the legal incidents which attach to it, and which by law may arise from it. He could not claim a right to the benefit of any contract made between the creditor and debtor in relation to the mode of satisfying the judgment, when it was voluntarily entered into, and not prescribed by law. The debtor has the right, without the consent of the creditor, to give a bond to release himself from arrest in execution. It does not depend upon the will of the creditor. It is a legal incident attached to the judgment and execution. The creditor is compensated by the bond for the liberation of the debtor. The bond belongs to the owner of the judgment. If the whole amount due upon the judgment was costs, upon which the attorney had a lien, would not he be entitled to the control of the bond? It would be his property, in equity, and he would have a