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STATE v. MC GAHEY.
295

appearing upon the information—was error. Peo. v. Hall, 12 N, W. Rep 665; Peo. v. Moran, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 470. Defendant's request should have been granted to have Mrs. Hill an eye witness of the shooting, sworn as a witness for the state. 7hompson v. State, 17 S. W. Rep. 448; Territory v. Hanna, 5 Pac. Rep. 252; Weller v. Peo., 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 283; Maher v. Peo., 10 Mich. 212; Hurd v. Peo., 25 Mich. 405; Peo. v. Gordon, 40 Mich. 716; State v. Magoon, 50 Vt. 338; Thomas v. Peo. 39 Mich. 309; State v. Middleham, 17 N. W. Rep. 446; Whart. Cl. Ev. § 448; Chapmans Case, 8 C. & P. 558; Orchards Case, 8 C. & P. 559; Peo. v. Dietz, 49 S. W. Rep. 296; Peo. v. Eller, 45 N. W. Rep. 1109. And the objection that the witness is not favorable to the prosecution is no excuse for not calling her. Weller v. Peo. 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 283; Hurd v. Peo., 25 Mich. 415; Territory v. Hanna, 5 Pac. Rep. 252. The statement of the prosecuting attorney in answer to defendant's request that Mrs. Hill be called for the state should have been stricken out. Hardtke v. State, 30 N. W. Rep.'726; Hall v. Wolf, 16.N. W. Rep. 711; Peo. v. Dane, 26 N. W. Rep. 781, Cross- examination of Mrs. Hill a witness for defendant as to acts of adultery with defendant on the pretense of impeaching her testimony,-but in fact proving another crime against the defendant was highly prejudicial and improper. Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 181; State v. McGee, 46 N. W. Rep. 764; State v. Starrett, 32 N. W. Rep. 387; Peo. v. Thurston, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 130; State v. Gordon, 3 la. 415; State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 125. The rule permitting cross-examination of a witness upon irrelevant matters affecting character as going to the creditability of the witness has never been extended to permit the repeated asking of questions upon the same line, all of which questions impute crime. Peo. v. Cahoon, 50 N. W. Rep. 384; Sullivan v. Dieter, 49 N. W. Rep. 263. When evidence tends to prove two things, one of which it may properly be admitted to prove but not the other, it should go to the jury, with an explanation from the court of its legitimate bearing. Webster v. Enfield, 10 Ill. 298; 2 Thomp. on Trials § 2416; Kelley v. State, 18 Tex. App. 262; Holmes v. State, 20 Tex. App.