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in his answer, and, although promptly stricken out on motion, it is urged that this was not sufficient to remove the poison that it had instilled in the minds of the jurors; that it was a case where it became the duty of the court, without any special request thereto, to caution the jury to disregard it. It has been held that where counsel, in argument to the jury, stated evidentiary matters of which there was no proof, it was the duty of the court, without request, to instruct the jury to disregard such statement. Yoe v. People, 49 Ill. 412. It has also been held that, where in- competent evidence has been admitted upon the statement of counsel that he would subsequently, by other evidence, so connect the incompetent testimony with the case as to remove the objection, and such subsequent testimony was not produced, it became the duty of the court to expressly withdraw such incompetent testimony from the jury. Dillin v. People, 8 Mich. 357. And it has even been held, under such circumstances, that the subsequent withdrawal of such testimony did not cure the error. Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273. And see Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. goo. A full discussion of the subject may be found in Thomp. Trials, § § 715, 723. While there is lack of uniformity in the decisions, no case is cited which fairly supports the contention of plaintiff in error in this case. The divergence of authority arises from the inherent difficulty in announcing any rule of universal application. When important testimony, bearing directly upon the issue, is introduced at one stage of the trial, and permitted to remain before the jury, while other testimony is given, forming an integral part of the facts, that find a lodgment in the minds of the jurors, and on which they reach their conclusions, and it subsequently appears that such former testimony was, for any cause, clearly improper, it is no doubt the duty of the court in explicit language to direct the jury to disregard such testimony. And the mind can readily suggest cases in which, by reason of the equipoise of the other evidence in the case, and the magnitude of the issues at stake, no words of the judge could certainly be relied upon to enable the jurors to entirely emancipate themselves