of the governor, a clerical assistant, whose salary is fixed at $1,000 aycar, and who is referred to in the act of 1890 as a “clerk,” and in the act of 1891 as “secretary.”
It appears that the point in question has not before arisen in the state. The law in question, as practically construed by the several state auditors, has been held to be adverse tg the relator's construction. Prior to the relator’s appointment, and since the state was admitted, two persons has been appointed to the position held by the relator, viz: F. W. Fancher and Harvey Harris. Both were paid salaries at the rate of $1,000 a year. While it is true that the relator is not necessarily concluded by the uniform rulings of the several state auditors who have practically construed the law against the relator’s theory, nor by the uniform acquiescence of his predecessors in office in such rulings, nevertheless it is true that the ruling of an executive officer upon a point where it is his sworn duty to act, especially where the rulings have been acquiesced in by those whose financial interests were involved, are always given considerable weight in the courts, and when the power is doubtful the uniform rulings in an executive office would be followed, and allowed to turn the scale. Cooley, Const. Lim. (3d Ed.) marg. pp. 69, 70. In the case at bar, however, we think there is a plain and necessary repugnancy between the territorial and state law upon the question involved, and of course the former must give way to the latter. The relator bases his claim wholly upon § 27 of the act of 1889. That section gave absolute authority to the territorial board to appoint a secretary, whose salary was fixed at $1,500 a year. No such authority has been conferred upon the state commissioners. The territorial board no longer exists. The abolition of that board by the repeal of the law which created it must be held to vacate all offices, and to cut off all official salaries, which came into existence by virtue of the law which is repealed. Mechem, Pub. Off. §§ 407, 408. We must therefore hold that § 27, Ch. 110, Laws 1889, is repugnant to both the constitution and laws of the State of North Dakota, and especially repugnant to the acts
