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could be vacated at a subsequent term by reason of its fraudulent procurement, it would seem that such a case is presented in the bill under consideration.” But after a not very thorough review of the authorities the court concludes: “We therefore feel compelled, though reluctantly, to hold that sound public policy, in this class of cases, forbids us from setting aside a decree of divorce a vinculo, though obtained by fraud and false testimony, on an original bill at a subsequent term.” See, also, McJunkin v. McJunkin, 3 Ind. 30; O'Connell v. O'Connell, 10 Neb. 390, 6 N. W. Rep. 467; Lewis v. Lewis, 15 Kan. 184; Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361. An examination of these cases will disclose that in almost every instance the decision was more or less influenced by sympathy of the judges for innocent third persons, who, on the strength of the decree, had intermarried with the divorced party, and for the helpless issue of such marriage. They were unwilling “to expunge a sentence of divorce with a stroke of the pen, bastardize after-begotten children, involve an innocent third person in legal guilt, and destroy rights acquired in reliance on a judicial act which was operative at the time.” Fortunately for us, as this record stands, our sympathies are not thus wrought upon; and, as a purely legal question, the overwhelming weight of authority is the other way. Holmes v. Holmes, 63 Me. 420; Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590; Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 46 Iowa, 437; Rush v. Rush, 1d. 649; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 41 Minn. 297, 43 N. W. Rep. 67; Allen v. Maclellan, 12 Pa. St. 328; Mansfield v. Mansfield, 26 Mo. 163; Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452. These cases establish beyond dispute the principle that—not less in divorce cases than in any other class of cases— courts of general jurisdiction possess, ex-necessitate, the power to emancipate themselves from the effects of a deceit practiced upon them, and to expunge from their records that which has been spread thereon only through fraud and deception. In no case “shall fraud be skillful enough to impose a sham upon a court of justice, to the injury of innocent parties, without any adequate remedy or reparation therefor.”