§ 10; Dill. Rem. Causes, c. 16; De Camp v. Miller, 44 N. J. Law, 617-620.
It is next urged that the court erred in proceeding with the trial of the case against the objections of the defendant, because, it is insisted, the notice of trial was insufficient. The notice stated that the issues would be tried at LaMoure, in the County of LaMoure, on the 1st day of September, 1891. As a matter of fact the term did not commence on that day, nor until September 1sth, 1891. The term fixed by the statute would have commenced on the 4th Tuesday of October. Chapter 79, Laws 1891, § 4. But a term had been called by the district judge for September 15th, and it was at this term that plaintiff moved the cause for trial. The objection is devoid of merit. The only object of a notice of trial is to give the party on whom it is served a chance to prepare for trial. A notice of trial, erroneous as to the day of trial, is nevertheless sufficient, if such notice, when read in the light of other information which the law gives, truly informs the party as to the time and place of trial, The defendant could not have failed to understand that the purpose of the plaintiff was to insist ona trial of this cause at the next ensuing term to be held in LaMoure county. As the time of the holding of such a term was fixed by the call of the district judge, the defendant, in common with all others interested in the matter, had notice that a term would commence September 15th, and not September 1st, as stated in the notice of trial, and was therefore aware that the date in the notice was an error, and was bound to know what the correct date was. We are clear that the trial court was right in over-ruling the point. See Insurance Co. v. Kelsey, 13 How. Pr. 535. Where an error in the date of a notice of trial occurs, it cannot mislead the opposing party, as the date of the commencement of the term is a matter of which he is bound to inform himself, and a comparison of that date with the date specified in the notice of trial will always disclose the error.
The point is made that at a term called by the district judge under the statute no new business can be taken up, and no new
