Howe-Hanlyn as being tantamount to a release of a mortgage by the mortgagee. We are of the opinion that these transactions do in law amount to a release of any mortgage interest Clifford acquired in Mrs. Howe-Hanlyn’s equitable estate, as well as a release of all the cquitable estate that Mrs. Howe-Hanlyn acquired by the contract. Certainly Clifford parted with all he had when he gave a warranty deed to the Hendricks bank and just as conclusively did Mrs. Howe-Hanlyn release all her right to have the title held as security for her notes when she gave the quit-claim deed. This must at least be held to be the effect as to third persons, whatever her rights might have been as to Peterson or the bank in case she had subsequently been called upon to pay one of the notes. As to the effect of a quit-claim deed, see 8 R. C. L. 926, 1024. By these transactions the Hendricks bank was clearly put in the position of owner of the legal and equitable title to the property free and clear of all obligations incident to the purchase contract of Mrs. Howe-Hanlyn. in this situation third parties clearly had the undoubted right to deal with the owner on the strength of the title and right thus appearing of record. Of the authorities hereinbefore cited, the following will be found to support the right of the purchaser where he has dealt with a mortgagee on the strength of a conveyance from the mortgagor or on the strength of a satisfaction of a mortgage: Henniges v. Paschke, supra; Ogle v. Turpin, supra; James v. Newman, supra; Jenks v. Shaw, supra; Ames v. Miller, supra; Marling v. Jones, supra; and Woodward v. McCullom, 16 N. D. 42,48.
The allegations in the complaint are not sufficiently definite to enable us to tell with certainty whether or not Allen received through the Hendricks bank and Peterson legal conveyances of the title of Clifford and the equitable estate of Josephine Howe-Hanlyn. This opinion obviously proceeds upon the theory that these are merged in Allen through legal conveyances. The plaintiff, of course, will be permitted to amend the complaint if advised in the light of this opinion that it has a cause of action against Allen.
For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the trial court properly sustained the demurrér of the defendant Allen. The order appealed from is affirmed.
Robinson, C. J., and Christianson, J., concur.
Bronson, J. I concur in result.
