terms of the contract, has a lien created by a statute, and, as well, a lien created by the contract of the parties.
In Roby v. Bank, 4 N. D. 160, Justice Barthlomew, speaking for the court said:
“The vendor has a lien for his purchase money by virtue of his contract, and a lien which the vendee cannot, by conveyance or otherwise, affect or impair, and which can be extinguished only by payment of the purchase money. * * * Such a vendor is not required to rely upon the technical vendor’s lien, which is a creature of equity, and exists where the vendor has parted with the legal title, and may be destroyed at any time by a conveyance by the vendee. He has a more substantial and indestructible lien, created by contract, and of which all the world must take notice.”
We think this language applies as well to the statutory lien as to a lien in equity. We think the principles above stated are further recognized and adopted in the cases of Nearing v. Coop, 6 N. D. 349, and Woodward v. McCollum and State Bank, 16 N. D. 49, and the authorities cited in those and the foregoing cases.
We think the vendee, in this character of contract, acquires an estate and interest in the land. In other words, becomes the equitable and beneficial owner, and is entitled to receive a conveyance of the title, as soon as he has performed his covenants contained in the contracts. Under such a contract, the vendor is the trustee of the title and has no authority to deliver the same to any other person than the vendee, except subject to vendee’s rights under the contract. In other words, if, after making such contract, the vendor gives a deed to a third person, it must be subject to the vendee’s rights, and that third person must be obligated, and is obligated, to do all that the vendor was obliged to do by the contract.
The vendor is bound by the contract for deed, just as much as the vendee. lor he contracted to deliver the deed on performance of the covenants agreed to be performed by the vendee. He also contracts to deliver the title by a good and sufficient deed. He is, therfore, from the time of making such a contract, a trustee of the title for the vendee. He is not at liberty to make a similar contract, selling the same property to a third person, except in subordination to the prior contract. In other words, he cannot lawfully deed the land to such third person, except subject to the prior contract, for that would be a violation of his trust relation to the vendee in the first contract.
