dice, and that this is shown by the amount of verdict returned. It is quite clear that both the plaintiff and the defendant looked upon the straw as being comparatively valueless at the time the alleged gift was made. The plaintiff admits he was getting it for nothing, and that the defendant was going to burn it anyway. The defendant claims he did not know what to do with the straw, was glad that any one would take it and intended to burn it before he left, in order to get rid of it. The length of the winter which followed, the severity of the season, and the ensuing scarcity of feed, caused the price of straw to go to a fabulous figure, and it does appear as if the jury were influenced by that. The plaintiff, if he can recover at all, could recover for the value of the straw at the time it was burned, and yet the jury gave him $480 for straw that he was getting for nothing, and which the defendant was burning to get out of the way. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the court believes justice requires that a new trial be granted, and so the verdict will be set aside and a new trial granted.”
We agree with these views of the trial court. The plaintiff at no time lived on the premises on which the straw was grown. He had a farm of his own in that vicinity. He lived on his own farm, and merely tilled the premises on which the straw was grown. He went on the premises for the purpose of doing whatever was necessary to carry out the stipulations of the contract. As pointed out by the trial court, he had removed no part of the straw, and had, in no manner, attempted to exercise dominion over it. He had been given permission to take whatever straw he wanted. He was not required to take all, or any specified part of it. If he saw fit to do so, he might decide to take nothing, or he might decide to take one load, or all of it. If he decided to take any of it, concededly he must take it within a specified time. Upon this both parties are agreed, although they disagree as to what time was specified. But no obligation rested upon the plaintiff to remove a single straw. We are agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had been granted merely a license or permission to go upon the premises and remove some of the straw, and that title to the straw had not become vested in him so that he might maintain an action against the defendant for damages for the destruction thereof.
It is well settled that an unexecuted parol license, without con- sideration, is revokable at any time before it is executed. 17 R. C. L. pp. 576-578. Also, that—
