Separate actions were instituted by the plaintiff and her husband for false imprisonment.
A number of errors are assigned upon this appeal, all of which it will not be necessary to consider, as we are of the opinion that the judgment cannot stand in its present form and that a new trial must be awarded.
Counsel for the defendants and appellants tacitly admit that the rights of the plaintiff have been invaded and that she has a cause of action. It is urged, however, that the evidence in the record is not sufficient to prove a conspiracy between Underwood, Harper, and Moran, or to otherwise connect Harper with the false imprisonment. We have examined the evidence with great care to ascertain the exact state of the proof of Harper’s connection with the arrest, and we fail to find any evidence to connect him with it. All the evidence shows in this connection is that when he related his difficulty in obtaining possession of the tent, Underwood suggested the advisability of taking or sending Moran along for the purpose of avoiding trouble, as it was thought that the Masons would offer no resistance in the presence of the chief of police. In other words, so far as Harper is concerned, at least, this record shows that the motive in sending Moran to the premises was to obtain the tent without trouble. He did not authorize Underwood to give Moran instructions, he did not know in advance that Moran contemplated arresting either the plaintiff or her husband, nor did he know of the arrest until after the parties were in jail. Neither did he in any way ratify the acts of Underwood and Moran. Thus, we think the evidence insufficient to charge Harper with a liability. At best, it only shows’that the tort-feasors purported to act in his interest and that he knew-in advance of their action that the plaintiff and her husband objected to his taking possession of the tent. From these facts alone we cannot infer that he authorized what was subsequently done. We cannot assume that he would countenance a false imprisonment for the sake of recovering a tent worth not to exceed $16.
Under the instructions of the court, the jury, in assessing damages, was authorized to assess against all defendants against whom they rendered a verdict an amount sufficient to serve as punitory damages or a sum that would be a warning to the defendants and all other persons not to commit similar wrongs. Clearly the jury, in arriving at an appropriate amount to assess as punitory damages, may justly consider
