Judge Buttz was trustee in bankruptcy, and that there was pending an action to have the conveyance to James set aside, had no bearing upon the order confirming the sale; that the defendant Sinness was merely the attorney who prosecuted both actions to a successful conclusion; that he had nothing to do with the transfer of the certificate of sale; that the defendant Aaker was merely the manager of the Mercantile Company, and was so known by the plaintiff to be; that there is no attack made upon the judgment of the Mercantile Company against James, and that this company bought the land upon the execution sale at its own peril; that the assignment of the certificate carried whatever ‘interest the Mercantile Company had in the land; that it possessed such interest as James had in the land at the time the judgment was docketed and levy made before James sold the premises to the plaintiff; that in this case there was a valid judgment and a valid execution; that there was no warranty of title contained in the assignment, nor any statement made as to the extent of the interest sold; that there is nothing to show that the company did not know that the sale would pass good title to the property; that no fraud is set up; that in the case of Buttz v. James, 33 N. D. 162, 178, 156 N. W. 547, the title of the trustee in the land was for the creditors to the extent of their claims, and that after the debts were paid the remainder of the estate was to be turned over to the parties entitled thereto; further, the plaintiff got title to the land from two sources, through Jessie James direct, by her conveyance alleged in the complaint, and through the certificate of sale and sheriff’s deed issued thereunder; that, upon taking judicial notice of these matters in connection with the demurrers, it was very clear that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the company; that without taking judicial notice the complaint itself fails to state a cause of action, for it seeks to recover the amount paid upon the grounds that the certificate of sale did not convey any interest in the land; that Jessie James was not the owner thereof, and that the execution sale did not sell any property of Jessie James.
We concur in the decision of the learned trial court. The sheriff’s certificate issued upon the execution sale carried the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor, subject to the right of redemption. § 8084, C. L. 1913. The assignment of this sheriff’s certificate operated likewise to transfer the rights of the judgment debtor in the land, subject to redemption. It transferred a property right in realty. Upon the expiration of the period of redemption and the issuance of a sheriff’s deed in
