of $50 and securing a war permit, or in force to the extent of 20 per cent. of the face thereof, upon securing a war permit only. The validity of that rule on grounds of public policy or otherwise is not attacked. It formed a part of the insurance contract. We are of the opinion that no acts of waiver nor such as to create an estoppel are shown. The order knew that the insured was in the service; it sent to his father, the beneficiary, a blank.application for a war permit, with the request that it be sent to the insured for signature and return as soon as possible, the order stating that it did not know the address of the insured. The father, as the record shows, did pay one assessment and lodge dues for the insured; the stipulated facts do not show that the insured paid any of such assessments or lodge dues after he entered the service. The necessity of a war permit has been voluntarily waived by the order. The failure of the order to demand or secure from the insured direct the payment of the extra war premium, and this application for a war permit, did not operate to make option 1 effective, in the absence of express acts of. waiver. Neither the insured nor his father, the beneficiary, made any attempt to exercise option 1. The assessinents and lodge dues were paid so as to invoke and make applicable option 2. The order has not attempted to claim or enforce a forfeiture of the policy. On the contrary, they assert a continuance of the policy under the limited liability of option 2. The knowledge of the order that the insured was in the service, and its continued acceptance of the assessments and lodge dues, operated, therefore, neither as a waiver or an estoppel. See Huntington v. Reserve Assoc. (Wis.) 181 N. W. 819; Miller v. Bankers’ Life Assoc., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R. 378. The limited liability under the rules of the order therefore applies, unless the provisions concerned, upon interpretation and construction, establish as grounds for the limitation causation, and not status.
In Myli v. American Life Insurance Co., supra, where the policy provided that if, within five years from date, the death of the insured shall occur while engaged in military or naval service in time of war, the company’s liability shall be limited, etc. This court held, upon construction of other provisions of the policy, that such provision did not exempt from liability where the death of the insured was not occasioned by extra hazard incident to military or naval service; further, that, where Status or occupation are not clearly the basis for exemption from liability,
and where the language employed indicates a desire to rely only against
