a suicide clause provides for nonliability in the event of suicide within one year after the issuance of the policy, with reference to which 14 R. C. L. at § 413 sets out the following:
“A provision in a policy for nonliability in the event of suicide within one year ‘after the issuance’ of the policy means a year after its date where premiums are paid from its date, and the other parts of the policy show that the day of its date was considered the day of its issuance.”
The following cases are there cited in support of that principle: Anderson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 164 Cal. 712, 130 Pac. 726, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 903; Harrington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 21 N. D. 447, 131 N. W. 246, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 373.
“A provision that suicide shall be no defense to an action to recover the insurance money if the policy had been in force for one year at the time of the death relates to the time of the suicidal act, and therefore if the insured commits suicide while sane, after the expiration of one year from the date of the policy, the company is liable, even though it appears that the suicide was premeditated before the expiration of the year, and was delayed to avoid its effect on the policy.”
So by analogy it would appear that, where as in this case the defendant specified that after the expiration of one year the policy would be incontestable, the premium having been fully paid and the policy being in full force and effect from its date, unless it rescinded and repudiated it within one year from its date, thereafter, under its stipulation, it had no defense against the payment of it, excepting only for the nonpayment of premium. It permitted the year and more to expire before it took any action to avoid and rescind the policy, and, there being no default in premium, it has, as before stated, no defense to the collection of the full amount of it. The incontestability clause is a part of the policy which is in evidence. The entire contract, including that clause, is to be construed to ascertain the intentions of the parties. Further discussion cannot further clarify this particular point. The intent and language of the clause is so plain that it construes itself. It is susceptible of but one meaning, and that is such as we have accorded it.
The trial court properly granted the motion of plaintiff for judgment on the special verdict, and properly denied a similar motion of defendant, as well as one for judgment non obstante. We have carefully examined all the errors assigned, and find none that are reversible. From what has Leen said, it is clear that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
