cerned the testimony adduced by the defendant that plaintiff’s reputation for chastity was bad was uncontradicted. It would also seem that if the plaintiff’s reputation for chastity was bad must have been a matter of such common comment that other witnesses could readily have been procured to testify to that fact. Under all the circumstances we cannot say, upon the record before us, that the trial court abused the judicial discretion with which it was vested in ruling as it did.
(2) It is next contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as follows:
“A woman has a right in pursuit of her walk of life to be free from molestation and assaults, whether they be physical assaults, or indecent assaults, as alleged in this case, and she has such a right to be free from these assaults, and any violation of this right that would cause her humiliation, pain, and suffering, or mortification such as charged in this complaint, would entitle her to damages for such violation of her rights. It would be the province of the jury, if they find that such rights have been violated, to award damages, such as would compensate her for injuries sustained.”
The argument is made that under this instruction the jury might have awarded damages to the plaintiff merely for molestation, even though no assault was committed at all. We do not believe that the instruction is susceptible of such interpretation. The instruction refers to assaults “as alleged in this case.” Under the evidence in this case the jury could not, in our opinion, possibly have found a verdict for the plaintiff under this instruction, unless they believed plaintiff’s story that defendant actually committed an assault upon her such as she testified to. If her story was true he did commit such assault; if defendant’s story was true he did not, and was wholly blameless. In our opinion the instruction given was in no manner prejudicial to the defendant.
(3) The defendant also predicates error upon the following instruction:
“If any witness has willfully testified falsely, in your judgment, you are at liberty to wholly disregard the testimony of such witness, except in so far as the same is corroborated by other credible evidence in the case; by other evidence which you have confidence in and believe. That would be as to material points.”
It is contended that it is only where a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in the case that the jury is justified in dis-
