the judgment creditors, to be determined when this action is tried on the merits. Hence it seems clear that the state was in no manner prejudiced by the order appealed from. Whether any other party was prejudiced thereby is not before us.
There is another reason why we may not consider the various questions urged for determination here. No restraining order was ever issued by the trial court, and no order was made staying proceedings pending the appeal. And in the record which the appellant has caused to be certified to this court on this appeal, there is contained the return which the sheriff made on the execution issued upon the justice’s judgment; and from that return it appears that the sheriff, on May 7, 1921, held the execution sale in accordance with the directions of the execution and the provisions of the order appealed from here. In other words, the record presented by the appellant shows affirmatively that before the appeal was taken the very acts which it was sought to have restrained had been performed. Hence the appeal presents merely questions which have become moot, and is subject to dismissal. Thompson v. Vold, 38 N. D. 569, 165 N. W. 1076; Holter v. Wagoner, 32 S. D. 137, 142 N. W. 175; Barber Asphalt Co. v. Hamilton, 80 Wash. 51, 141 Pac. 199; Carr v. Montesano, 76 Wash. 380, 136 Pac. 363; Wiebke v. Ft. Wayne, 64 Ind. App. 38, 115 N. E. 355; Crise v. Slagle, 129 Md. 453, 99 Atl. 669; 4 C. J. 584. See, also, State v. Albertson, 25 ‘N. D. 206,141 N. W. 478; In re Kaeppler, 7 N. D. 307, 75 N. W. 253; Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43, 54 L. ed. 1121; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 16 Sup. Ct. 132, 4o L. ed. 293.
It follows from what has been said that we cannot interfere with the order entered by the trial court, and it is affirmed.
Grace, C. J., and Ropinson, Birdzell, and Bronson, JJ., concur.
