lateral which is made in 'any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying’ a judgment or decree." Freeman, Judgm. 4th ed. § 336.
In Shary v. Eszlinger, we found that the laws of Texas permitted a judgment obtained by fraud to be vacated or the enforcement thereof to be enjoined. 176 N. W. 939. And we concluded that the requirement of the Federal Constitution, “that full faith and credit shall be given in one state to the judgments obtained in another, will not prevent the courts of this state, in which legal and equitable rights and remedies are administered in one court and in one form of action, from permitting an equitable defense to be interposed against a judgment obtained by fraud in another state, where the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered are authorized to vacate or enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained by fraud."
In this case the plaintiff seeks to attack the judgment in the divorce action collaterally. It is contended that the demurrer admits that the judgment is wrong, and that it was obtained by the wrongful and unlawful practices set forth in the complaint. This contention ignores the fundamental rules applicable to judgments. The complaint shows that the judgment in question was rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, in an action duly pending and brought to trial before it; that the court had unquestioned jurisdiction of the parties to, and the subject-matter of, the controversy determined by the judgment; that the judgment was rendered more than ten years ago, and that it has not been set aside or corrected in any proceeding provided by our laws for the vacation or correction of judgments. The averments in the complaint charging misconduct and wrongful acts on the part of the trial court contradict the basic provisions of the judgment. The very essence of plaintiff's action is that the judgment is wrong,—that the facts required the rendition of a judgment different from that which was rendered. The judgment cannot be thus impeached. As long as it stands, it imports absolute verity as to every proposition of law and fact essential to its existence against the parties to it. Schultz v. Schultz, 136 Ind. 323, 43 Am. St. Rep. 320, 36 N. E. 126; Freeman Judgm. 4th ed. § 289; VanFleet, Collateral Attack, § 550. Hence, the allegations of misconduct on the part of the trial court and the defendant are for all purposes the same as though they were not contained in the complaint. So far as this action is concerned, they are conclusively denied, and said to be without foundation in fact or in law, by the other allegations in the complaint, which allege that the judgment was render-
