the trial court found in plaintiff’s favor upon the disputed questions of fact.
Decision—The respondent does not question the legality of the guardian’s sale and deed. On the contrary, he relies upon its validity in order to sustain the lien of the mortgage. It is not necessary to give serious consideration, nor does the respondent, to the testimony concerning nonbidding or the assumption of the mortgage by Swanson. Eynon had no intention to bid on the three lots, and certainly not upon the extra lot mentioned in the guardian’s deed. The property was sold as it was agreed that it should be sold. There is no contention made that the property, or any part of it, was sold at an improper low price, or that a greater price could have been secured therefor. 24 Cyc. 28. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Swanson agreed to take up the mortgage prior to the payment of Swanson’s advances to Thompson, and the trial court does not so find. The respondent relies for protection upon the recording act. §§ 5594—5598, C. L. 1913. That his mortgage, taken bona fide for a valuable consideration without notice of any claim or lien, is, under these statutes, prior, although taken from one in possession of the realty under an unrecorded contract of purchase, citing Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N. D. 638, 147 N. W. 804, L. R. A. 1918C, 780. He contends that Thompson was the full equitable owner of the premises when the mortgage was made, and that, accordingly, the conclusions of the trial court should be sustained.
The purpose of the recording statutes is to give notice of, and to protect, rights as against subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, not to create rights not possessed, either of record or in fact. This purpose is apparent even though the recording act protects concerning subsequently acquired title through the doctrine of inurement. See § 5529, C. L. 1913. The recording statutes apply as notice only to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. Sarles v. McGee, 1 N. D. 365, 48 N. W. 231, 26 Am. St. Rep. 633. In this case, the title involved is dependent upon a judicial sale, a sale in guardianship proceedings. Both parties, in order to maintain any right at all, must rely upon the validity and regularity of this judicial sale. This sale is not questioned in this proceeding. May it be said that, prior to this judicial sale, either Thompson or Swanson had any title in the premises? May a guardian part with a right or an interest in the estate, and thus abrogate the statutory authority of the court both before and after the sale? It is plainly apparent that, prior to the judicial sale, Thompson possessed no equitable title such as existed in the vendee of a contract
