Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/43

fendant had also approached, tampered with, and influenced W. F. Cochrane, one of plaintiff’s attorneys, to disparage plaintiff’s cause, after the decision of the trial court, and to advise the plaintiff not to appeal from said decree. That at the conclusion of the trial the judge, acting in accordance with the understanding between him and the defendant, made findings of the fact and conclusions of law, and ordered the entry of decree in said action in which it was found that all the allegations of defendant’s complaint were abundantly supported by the evidence; that his application for a divorce was sustained upon all the grounds alleged in the complaint, and that defendant should be granted a divorce upon the grounds stated in his complaint. That, “in accordance with said findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, made and entered as aforesaid, a decree of said district court was entered of record on the 27th day of January a. d. 1909, and is now of record therein wholly unreleased, unmodified, and unchanged.” That the evidence offered by the plaintiff on the trial of such divorce action “was in all respects abundantly sufficient not only to refute and defend against disputed allegations of defendant’s complaint, but to fully maintain the allegations of plaintiff's counterclaim and cross complaint;” that in deciding the case the trial judge, influenced by defendant’s corrupt bargaining, disregarded the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, and gave no weight or credit thereto, and made his findings, conclusions, and order for judgment not in accordance with the weight of the evidence, or the right and justice of the cause, but in conformity with his previous arrangement with the defendant. That after the entry of said decree her attorney, one W. F. Cochrane, was left in entire charge of the case; that said attorney disparaged and discouraged an appeal; and that when an appeal to the supreme court was ordered by the plaintiff, and said attorney, in conformity to the corrupt influence, premises, and bribery of said defendant, proceded so indifferently and in a manner so slack and negligent that said appeal was dismissed by the supreme court, without a review of the merits of the said appeal. That if said action had been tried and disposed of justly and impartially, without the exercise of undue influence upon the presiding judge of said court, or upon the plaintiff’s attorney, she has reason to believe and does believe that, properly placed upon a preponderance of the evidence introduced, plaintiff would have been given a divorce from said defendant, and awarded a proportion of said property accumulated during the marriage of plaintiff and defendant, to the sum of at least $300,000.”