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WILSON v. CITY OF FARGO
449

Railroad Co. v. Smith, 103 Fed. 372; Fillimore v. Van Horn, (Mich.) 88 N. W. 69; State v. Burlington &c (Neb.) 84 N. W. 254.

The term “subject” as used in § 58 and § 61 of the Constitution means the matter to which the statute relates, the purpose sought to be effected by the legislation. 36 Cyc. 1022, Statutory Construction; G. N. Ry. Co. v. Duncan, (N. D.) 176 N. W. 992; Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 83; Matter of Mayer, 50 N. Y. 507; Dorsey’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192.

The act must be construed in the light of its general purpose and object, and if so construed, its provisions appear to be in furtherance of one general purpose and plan they will be considered to be germane to one another. State v. Peake, 18 N. D. 101; G. N. Ry. Co. v. Duncan (N. D.) 176 N. W. 992; 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 143; G. N. Ry. v. Duncan, (N. D.) 176 N. W. 992; Johnson v. Harrison (Minn.) 50 N. W. 923.

The different matters incorporated in a bill must be so closely related as to constitute but separate parts of a consistent plan which is readily discernible in the act itself. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Duncan (N. D.) 176 N. W. 992; State v. Nomland, 3 N. D. 427; Richards v. Stark Co. 8 N D. 392; Divet v. Richland Co. 8 N. D. 65; Fitzmaurice v. Wells, 20 N. D. 372; Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494, 512.

It is not permissible to enact a law which amends a section by changing only some portion of it, and by publishing only the part or the words which create the change. Copeland v. Price, (Wash.) 67 Pac. 227; In re Buelow, 98 Fed. 86; State v. Guiney, (Kans.) 40 Pac. 926; Douglas Co. v. Hayes, (Neb.) 71 N .W. 1023; Blakemore v. Dolan, 15 Ind. 194; Dodd v. State, 18 Ind. 56; Erickson v. Cass Co. 11 N. D. 494, 512; State v. Fargo Bottling Works, 19 N. D. 396, 410, 411.

Grace, C. J. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Cass County overruling a demurrer to a complaint. The action is said to be a friendly one brought by the plaintiff as a taxpayer on his own behalf and all persons similarly situated, to restrain a proposed special election in the City of Fargo, called pursuant to chap. 122, Session Laws of 1921, which makes certain amendments to an amendatory act relating to the exemption of property from taxation and which also provides for limitation of tax levies, in that, political subdivisions, are authorized to exceed the limitations specified in said Chapter by twenty-five per cent (25%) upon authorization by a majority of the electors voting at a