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48 NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS

In School District No. 94 v. King, 20 N. D. 618 the constitutionality of chap. 106 of the Laws of 1907 was challenged on the ground that it contravened § 61 of the constitution. The act of 1907 was one to amend § 949 of the Revised Codes of 1905 which was “An act to Provide for a Uni- form System of Free Public Schools Throughout the State and Prescribe Penalties for Violation of the Provisions Thereof.” In that case part of the amendatory act did not affect the rights of the plaintiff or any of the inhabitants of the district. This portion of that act conferred authority upon the County Commissioners to attach certain portions of the School district to a school district of another county. But had the rights of plaintiff been affected by that provision, in view of the construction placed on the remainder of the amendment by the court, there would seem to be no doubt that the court would have upheld the constitutionality of the act in this respect for the same reason that it held that the remainder of the amendment was within the original act. The court there said with reference to the amendment “The title of the act of 1890 (the original act) is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include § 170 of that act which was the same substantially as § 949 until amended in 1907. The general subject of public schools includes the division of school districts. So in this case it can with as much reason be said that the title of the original Revenue and Taxation Act of 1890 above mentioned, now chap. 34, of the Comp. Laws of 1913, is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include chap. 122, for all that is in the latter relates to taxation and to no other subject. Reasoning of somewhat similar nature is contained in State v. Fargo Bottling Works, 19 N. D. 396 and Erickson v. Cass County, 11 N. D. 494. In the latter case it was said ‘“The Supreme Court of Missouri in construing a constitutional provision of that state in all respects like § 61 supra, in the City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578-590 said: While the clause was embodied in the organic law for the protection of the state and the legislature, it was not designed to be unnecessarily restrictive in its operations, nor to embarrass legislation by compelling a needless multiplication of separate bills. It was only the intention to prevent the con- joining in the same act of incongruous matters and of subjects having no legitimate connection or relation to each other. If the title of an original act is sufficient to embrace the provisions contained in an, amendatory act, it will be good, and it need not be inquired whether the title of the amendatory act would of itself be sufficient. Branden v. State 16 Ind. 197; State v. Meade 71 Mo. 267 is to the same effect. The Constitution of Indiana contains provisions almost identical with §§ 61 and 64. The Su-