It will be noticed that the Constitution of Idaho provided that “right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice,” and that the legislature has neglected to specify in the statute that prejudice of the judge is a ground for a change of the place of trial, and the court held that it was error of the trial court not to grant a change of the trial, notwithstanding the omission in the law above referred to, for the reason that not to do so was in contravention of that section of the Constitution of that state thereunder consideration.
If that reasoning is correct—and we see no weakness in it—it is just as applicable here, where, in the state of the pleadings by demurrer to the complaint, it is admitted that justice has been sold, and where there is no law providing in these circumstances, that the trial court shall thereafter not have jurisdiction, as it was in the Idaho case, to prejudice where there was no law which specified that prejudice shall be a ground for a change of venue.
In this state we have no statute of which we are cognizant, which provides that, where a court is bribed or makes a sale of justice in judicial proceedings, that its jurisdiction ceases as soon as those acts occur. But surely no law is needed. Section 22 of our Constitution is self-executing. It is thus sufficient in itself for the prevention of evils mentioned therein. By its very provisions no court has any power to do anything therein prohibited, and courts have jurisdiction to administer justice only, in harmony with the true intent thereof.
We are of the opinion that the decree of divorce was absolutely void and of no effect, for the reason that, assuming the allegations of the complaint as true, it was procured by bribery, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to render it. It was of no validity or verity, in the face of this record. Hence, this proceeding is not a collateral attack, for. a collateral attack implies a valid judgment or decree, which does not exist in this case.
A judgment absolutely void is not made valid by the lapse of time. Heffner v. Gunz, 29 Minn. 108, 12 N. W. 342; Feikert v. Wilson, 38 Minn. 341, 37 N. W. 585; McNamara v. Casserly, 61 Minn. 335, 63 N.
If the demurrer in this case were overruled, which it should be, and the defendant should thereafter interpose his answer, and the case thereafter proceeded to trial in the ordinary way upon the issues thus formed, it is manifest that, before plaintiff could recover the damages claimed, she would be required to prove, by competent testimony, the allegations
