proposed measures of which the public, or even the members of the legislature themselves, can have no notice prior to the third reading of a bill. The majority of the members of this court regard the decision as mischievous in the extreme.
The opinion under consideration, following much the same line of reasoning, also holds that the title of the act is not duplicitous within § 61 of the constitution. In our opinion it requires no further discussion to demonstrate the fallacy of this holding, but we must likewise take note of its consequences. Under it omnibus legislation of every character is invited. Members of the legislature can now constitutionally tack on to a bill relating specifically to any given subject, additional matter without end and separate proposals without number so long as they all relate to some broad subject such as taxation, civil procedure, criminal procedure or the like, and the members will be constantly confronted with the alternative of voting against legislation they desire or, to use a figure applied by our associate, of swallowing the act whole as the whale swallowed Jonah. It was the purpose of § 61, of the constitution to prevent the legislature from effectively adopting any such procedure as this; but now that it is judicially recognized, the clear purpose of § 61 is thwarted and omnibus legislation may well become the rule. It is not difficult to tack on to legislation dealing with one specific subject other proposals that may be linked with the first under some broad general subject. After all, how much legislation is ever proposed that is not in some manner related to something that has gone before? To say that, this generic relationship may be seized upon to establish singleness cf subject where two or more distinct legislative proposals are contained in the same bill—where the proposals are in no manner connected with any consistent purpose discoverable in the bill itself—therefore, is to practically deny the possibility of having more than one subject.
Thus § 61 of the constitution, too, is effectually deprived of all the meaning it ever had. The rule laid down in this opinion if consistently followed by two members of this court, also takes from the people the protection that an observance of § 61 would give. It makes possible all the mischief that this section was designed to prevent. If those who propose to amend a section of the law relating to the exemption of property from taxation cannot have that proposal considered on its merits except as it is linked with a proposal to limit the amount of taxes that may be levied py the political sub-divisions of the state, what other
