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the corporate name for certain purposes. The duty of liquidation is the same, in our opinion, under both forms of statutes, and the obligations of directors as trustees are identical. In our opinion, the right of the majority stockholders—much less of the defendants as trustees—to appropriate to themselves the good will or other assets of a corporate business is no greater than the right of the minority to do so. Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50, 10 Sup. Ct. 224, 33 L. ed. 524. Our conclusion is that neither has such right, but that the directors are chargeable as trustees for the proper disposition of all of the assets, including the good will. Being chargeable as trustees and having in that capacity disposed of the assets, including the good will, to a new corporation of which they are directors, the law holds them to strict accountability, and places upon them the burden of showing fairness and the full adequacy of the consideration. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. et al., 254 U.S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209, 65 L. ed. —, Advance Opinions U. S. Supreme Court, February, 1921, p. 227. They have not sustained that burden in this case. It goes without saying that the defendants had no right to acquire the interest of the plaintiffs in the old corporation at a valuation fixed by themselves, or by appraisers selected by them without notice to the plaintiffs. Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., supra. Since under the law the defendants are accountable to the plaintiffs for the value of the good will of the business to the same extent that they are accountable for the other assets of the corporation, we are confronted with the necessity of ascertaining that value. We must confess that the task is difficult beyond that usually experienced in ascertaining facts of a more tangible character. But this difficulty does not render the duty any the less imperative nor, in a case of this character, should it. obscure the point of view from which the valuation is to be made. Manifestly, a value estimated according to what the good will would bring if subjected to forced sale would be altogether inequitable. The good will in the instant case has not been subjected to forced sale. On the contrary, it has been so dealt with that those who enjoy it reap the fullest measure of value attaching to it. There was no interruption in the business, and the patrons were not aware that a change had taken place. In view of this, it cannot properly be valued according to what would have been realized under less favorable circumstances. The right viewpoint, we think, in these circumstances is that suggested by Sir John Romilly, Master of