may be properly refused if such evidence, being admitted, would not change the result. The same principle has been sometimes expressed in different language, but the meaning is usually that above conveyed. The foregoing expression is equivalent to saying that the motion should not be granted, unless the court can see from the showing made that a different verdict will probably result from a retrial with the new evidence added. In other words, in order to warrant a denial of the motion the court must be of the opinion that the admission of the new evidence would not cause a different result. * * *
“As in all cases where the matter rests almost absolutely within the discretion of individual men, no specific rule of any value, subordinate to and definitive of the leading rule, and applicable generally, can be laid down. * * * The following is suggested as * * * the * * * rule in criminal cases: It is not required that the new evidence shall be so important or conclusive of the point upon which it is offered as to create, with the evidence introduced at the trial, a preponderance in favor of the defendant’s innocence, but only that it create a reasonable doubt of his guilt.” Spelling’s New Tr. & App. Pr. § 221.
The difficulty which confronts us in this case is one of interpreting the actual findings of the trial judge.
It is true he denied the motion for a new trial, but according to his memorandum opinion he was not satisfied with the evidence on which the verdict was based, and apparently the controlling reason for denying the motion for a new trial was that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. In the certificate of probable cause certain language is used, which seems to imply that the trial judge believed that the conviction of the defendant was due, largely if not wholly, to the testimony of the witness Mrs. Manning. He was not justified in denying the motion for a new trial here merely because he was of the opinion that there was substantial evidence tending to support the verdict. If he was of the opinion that the proposed evidence was newly discovered, and could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced by the defendant upon the trial of the action; and if he further was of the opinion that the newly discovered evidence probably would, and ought to, bring about a different result upon another trial—in other words, if the trial judge was of the belief that the new evidence was of such character that, considered in connection with the evidence adduced upon the trial, it would be likely to create
