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48 NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS

an excessive amount for the personal property which was left with the defendant for sale. This item was allowed by the trial court at $363. It is claimed that it should have been allowed at $227, the amount that was actually realized when the property was sold. The added amount was allowed by the trial court as the reasonable value at the time when the defendant should have returned the property or credited the plaintiff with its value. He found that the sale was not made within a reason- able time and in the best market.

(3) It is contended that the trial court should have allowed the defendant to recover interest on the $500 personal property note that was returned to the plaintiff.

(4) That the court erred in fixing plaintiff’s interest in the land at the amount paid on the land by the plaintiff together with his portion of the interest and taxes while the land was jointly owned.

The respondent contends:

(1) That the court erred in allowing the defendant to charge interest and taxes as expenses of the farming operations on the three quarter sections in I9I9.

(2) That the plaintiff should have a credit for a quantity of hay put up in 1919, for which no credit was allowed.

We have stated only the principal contentions. There are other minor matters of difference between the parties. A careful review of the record leaves us with the impression that any alterations we might make in the judgment would not be likely to effect a better adjustment of the accounts than that ‘represented by the judgment of the trial court. The evidence is conflicting as to the agreement to consider interest and taxes on the defendant’s land as expenses to be allowed, but we are not dis- posed to disturb the finding of the trial court. The record, as a whole, is quite inconclusive for the reason, principally, that the defendant kept the books and his testimony, on a number of subjects, is most confusing. Apparently this is not due to any attempt to take advantage, as the trial court remarked in the memorandum opinion that both parties had evidenced a desire to be fair and reasonable.

The judgment is affirmed.

Grace, C. J., and Bronson, Robinson, and Christianson, JJ., concur.