Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/611

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MERCHANTS’ STATE BANK v. STREEPER
587

in the contract. This equity is held by the plaintiff bank as security for the note in suit; and, when the note is paid, of course the defendant becomes fully reinvested with all rights in and to said equity free and clear of all claims on the bank. The note in suit by its terms became payable at a specified date. If the purchaser of the land had gone ahead with the contract, put in the crop, and been successful in raising it, there might have been sufficient moneys realized therefrom so that ‘the share coming to the defendant for his commission would have been fully paid, and thereby in turn the note in suit been discharged. That was doubtless what was anticipated by the defendant and the cashier of tie bank. It will be noted, however, that the defendant expressly admits in his testimony that he agreed to take chances on his commission the same as the bank took on the purchase price stipulated to be paid by the purchaser for the land.

The note in suit was made payable at a time which would make it possible to utilize any moneys paid by the purchaser (Dom) upon the land contract, and in turn payable to the defendant as commission for obtaining such purchaser, to pay off the note in suit. This, however, did not affect the note. As we construe the evidence, it establishes, without any actual conflict therein, that the note in suit was given for a sum of money loaned by the bank to the defendant. The note was made payable at a definite time. It has not been paid according to its terms, or at all. In our opinion there was in this case no room for different conclusions as to the material facts. And there was, we think, no basis in the evidence for the verdict absolving the defendant from liability upon the note. We are therefore agreed that the trial court was entirely correct in ordering the verdict to be set aside; and inasmuch as the evidence affirmatively discloses that the defendant has no defense to plaintiff’s cause of action, it would be an idle ceremony to remand the cause for a new trial, and it is therefore ordered that the order and judgment appealed from be, and the same hereby are, affirmed.


Bronson}}, Birdzell, and Robinson, JJ., concur.


Robinson, J. (concurring). This case merits little consideration or discussion. The facts are not in dispute. The defense is clearly false and grossly unconscionable. On a worthless and abandoned con-