resident of the city for some 35 years and that he knew that the plat, in certain particulars, was incorrect; that other tracts besides those shown thereon as belonging to the protestants did, in fact, belong to the protestants. This was the only evidence adduced upon this proposition. Leaving all questions as to the competency of the testimony of Peitz wholly on one side, and assuming without deciding that the ownership of the property might be proven in this manner, Peitz’s testimony does not prove that the protests were in fact signed by the owners of a majority of the property liable to be specially assessed for the improvement. The plaintiffs’ action is predicated upon alleged irregularities in the proceedings before the city council. As already indicated, the principal irregularity averred is that the city council proceeded in disregard of a valid protest. Manifestly the plaintiffs had the burden of establishing that a sufficient protest was filed. Hamilton, Special Assessments, §§ 694, 736, 569, 558, 432; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 2117, 2010. That burden has not been sustained. And while the evidence is not satisfactory, the only deduction that can reasonably be made from the evidence in this case is that the protests were not signed by the owners of a majority of the property liable to be specially assessed for the improvement.
It is next contended that there is evidence tending to establish that the city council acted fraudulently. There is no contention, however, that there is any direct evidence of fraud. But it is asserted that the city engineer was largely responsible for the action of the council; and it is said that—
‘Usually the engineer has some friend contractor with whom he is dealing or in whose business he has a direct interest, and instead of representing the city and guarding its interests he is really in ‘cahoots’ with the contractor.”
The evidence does not, however, establish any such condition. There is, in our opinion, no evidence of fraud, and we fully agree with the findings by the trial court on this question. It is said that the improvements are too expensive, and are of doubtful value. These, of course, are administrative or legislative, and not judicial, questions. 25 R. C. L. p. 99; McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 2004. There are few, if any, municipal improvements constructed but that some one questions the necessity or reasonableness thereof. The power to determine these questions is conferred upon the city council. The court
