to act for the company is presumably more limited than that of McGowan. The evidence tends to establish that at the time McGowan and Haigh were at Boerger’s place for the purpose of securing a settlement of the first premium note they solicited him to apply for reinstatement of his policy, and that in that connection they represented to him that if he would give his note for the premium he would be reinstated. McGowan produced a reinstatement application, which he filled out, and which Boerger signed; McGowan witnessing the application.
In our view of the case it is not necessary to determine whether or not McGowan had authority, either actual or ostensible, to waive the provisions of the contract regarding the payment of premiums. We are of the opinion that he was acting within the scope of his agency in soliciting the reinstatement. This he was doing in the interest of the company, and he had apparently been stipplied with blanks to the facilitate the transaction of this character of business for it. In transacting it, he was not acting as the agent of Boerger. Our statute provides (§ 6632, C. L. 1913):
“Any person who shall solicit an application for insurance upon the life of another shall, in any controversy between the assured or his beneficiary and the company issuing any policy upon such application, be regarded as the agent of the company and not the agent of the assured.”
Ordinarily an insurance company is as much interested in retaining relations with its policy holders as it is in soliciting new business, and to this end applications for reinstatement are regarded with much the same favor as applications for new business. We are of the opinion that the definition of an agent laid down in the statute referred to includes one taking an application for reinstatement as well as one taking an original application. In fact, the counsel for the appellant in the instant case take a position that is entirely consistent with this construction of the statute for it is contended that, as the policy in question had lapsed, it could not be revived except a new contract be entered into by the parties; the new contract being, of course, an agreement to revive the policy.
In holding, however, that McGowan and Haigh were agents of the company in soliciting the reinstatement application, we do not hold that the company was necessarily bound by the representations that they made contrary to the express conditions of the contract which was being revived. But we do hold that their agency was one which lasted until the reinstatement was either effected or rejected, and, while their authority
